The recent attack on Apple iTunes Digital Rights Management [17] has brought to light the usefulness of proxy reencryption schemes for Digital Rights Management. It is known that the use of proxy re-encryption would have prevented the attack in [17] . With this utility in mind and with the added requirement of non-repudiation, we propose the first ever signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption that does not involve bilinear maps. Our scheme is called RSA-TBOS-PRE and is based on the RSA-TBOS signcryption scheme of Mao and Malone-Lee [7] . We adapt various models available in the literature concerning authenticity, unforgeability and non-repudiation and propose a signature non-repudiation model suitable for signcryption schemes with proxy re-encryption. We show the non-repudiability of our scheme in this model. We also introduce and define a new security notion of Weak-IND-CCA2, a slightly weakened adaptation of the IND-CCA2 security model for signcryption schemes and prove that RSA-TBOS-PRE is secure in this model. Our scheme is Weak-IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, extensible to multi-use and does not use bilinear maps. This represents significant progress towards solving the open problem of designing an IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, multi-use scheme not using bilinear maps proposed in [15][12].
INTRODUCTION
Proxy Re-encryption is a new and interesting area of cryptography, pioneered by Blaze et al. [2] . In proxy re-encryption, a ciphertext meant for a user (say Bob) may be converted to a ciphertext meant for another user (say Charlie), with the help of a semi-trusted third party called proxy. The chief feature of this system is that this delegation is achieved without the proxy learning anything about the plaintext. Proxy Re-encryption thus models the concept of secure delegation through a semi-trusted party.
The proxy that actually carries out the transformation is semi-trusted in the sense that it is curious and and thus it may attempt to discover the plaintext or secret keys using the information that is legitimately provided to it, but will follow the laid out protocol perfectly. This is a reasonable assumption to make in many practical scenarios, as the proxy is typically a part of the institution using the delegation mechanism. Thus, any deviation from the protocol can be easily detected and deemed malicious. This ease of detection forces the proxy to resort to passive attacks and rules out active attacks.
The primitive of proxy re-encryption has several interesting applications, as there are number of scenarios in which we wish to convert the ciphertext of one user to another, with the help of a party that cannot be fully trusted. A wellknown example is that of the DRM of Apple's iTunes [17] . In March 2005, Apple's iTunes DRM was cracked by programmers who managed to steal the plaintext (song) made available during a translation from a ciphertext encrypted under a global key into a ciphertext encrypted under a key unique to each iPod. This attack was possible as the reencryption was carried out by first decrypting the ciphertext encrypted under a global key and then encrypting it under the key for a particular iPod. If Apple had used a proxy re-encryption scheme, then the plaintext of the song would not have been available to steal. Secure email forwarding [3] and distributed secure storage systems [4] are two other examples.
All the proxy re-encryption schemes proposed to date provide the important primitive of confidentiality. However, many practical applications also demand the property of non-repudiation. This property is one of the chief characteristics of digital signature schemes. In 1997, Zheng [6] pro-posed the concept of signcryption, which provides both confidentiality and non-repudiation in single primitive, by performing both encryption and signing simultaneously. This primitive is more efficient than signing and encrypting separately, making it an ideal candidate for use in systems that require both confidentiality and non-repudiation.
A typical scenario that would require signcryption with proxy re-encryption would be when confidential data requiring authentication or non-repudiation must be transferred from one device to another (e.g. transfer from the iTunes server to an iPod). Proxy re-encryption would be indispensible due to the attack on iTunes described above. Signcryption would be required as authenticity/non-repudiability of the message is necessary.
Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first describe the original RSA-TBOS scheme along with the proof of correctness, followed by the additional calculations that are required for proxy re-encryption. We then discuss various properties of our scheme, followed by a discussion of various non-repudiation models and a proof of non-repudiability. Then follows the discussion and definition of suitable models for security for systems like ours. We then show our scheme can be made into a multi-use one using the technique given in [13] . Finally, we conclude the paper with a recap of the important results shown and suggest directions for future research. A rigourous formal proof of Weak-IND-CCA2 security is provided in the full version.
RSA-TBOS WITH PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
We describe our scheme, RSA-TBOS-PRE, a signcryption with proxy re-encryption in two parts. The first part (signcryption) is the RSA-TBOS scheme itself, which we reproduce here for convenience. The second part consists of the additional calculations required to perform proxy reencryption. This is followed by a discussion of various properties that the scheme possesses.
RSA-TBOS Signcryption scheme
Key Parameters:
• k : Even positive integer.
• and k = n + k1 + k0, with 2 −k 0 and 2 −k 1 being negligible. Note that the output size of H is greater than the input size, but is deemed a hash function as it satisfies all other properties of hash functions (such collision resistance etc.).
Signcryption:
When Alice signcrypts a message M ∈ {0, 1} n for Bob, she performs:
ω ← H(M ||r).

s ← G(ω) ⊕ (M ||r).
4. If s||w > NA goto 1.
7. c ← c e B (modNB).
8. Send c to Bob.
Unsigncryption:
When Bob unsigncrypts a cryptogram received from Alice, he performs:
4. Parse μ as s||ω.
10. Parse μ as s||ω.
13. Return M .
Correctness of Unsigncryption
We now show that given a valid signcrypted text, the unsigncryption algorithm returns the original plaintext. The first step of the unsigncryption merely gets back the ciphertext c from c, as
At the second step, we assume that the c < NB branch was taken during the signcryption. In this case, clearly c < NA is true, because we did calculations modulo NA during the signcryption. The other case, namely c > NB will handled from step 7 onwards. We then make consistency checks in steps 5 and 6. Clearly, because we had s ← G(ω) ⊕ (M ||r) during the signcryption, we will have M ||r = G(ω) ⊕ s during the unsigncryption if the ciphertext is appropriately formed. Also, as in the signcryption, we will have ω = H(M ||r). Thus, if c < NB , the ciphertext unsigncrypts correctly. Now, if indeed c < NB, the algorithm will end at step 6 returning the message M . Else, we must add 2 k−1 to the ciphertext to undo the subtraction during the signcryption. Steps 8 to 12 are identical to steps 2 to 6, and are correct by the same argument. The last step merely returns the message. Thus, even in the case c > NB the unsigncryption works correctly.
Further calculations for
Proxy Re-encryption , such a restriction can be easily met. We now show how the re-encryption and unsigncryption works.
Let c be the cryptogram sent from Alice to Bob, which has to be delegated to Dave. The re-encryption algorithm (carried out by the proxy) is as follows:
Re-encryption:
Upon receiving the pair (u, v) from the proxy, Dave uses the unsigncryption algorithm as follows:
2. Run the unsigncryption algorithm exactly as Bob would, using u in place of c and d in place of dB.
To see that this leads to the appropriate answer, we just need to observe that
e (mod NB ) ; the proof of correctness of the unsigncryption algorithm is simply as explained for the basic signcryption scheme above, with u in place of c and d in place of dB.
Proxy Re-Encryption Properties
RSA-TBOS-PRE is unidirectional, non-interactive, nontransitive and single-use proxy re-encryption scheme.
1. In unidirectional schemes, the proxy cannot compute the ReKey from B to A, given the ReKey from A to B. However, in a bi-directional scheme it can. It is clear that RSA-TBOS-PRE is unidirectional, as ReKey from A to B does not even involve the secret key of B, whereas ReKey from B to A requires B's secret key.
2. In non-interactive schemes, the delegatee is not involved in the computation of ReKey, while in interactive schemes it is. Our scheme is obviously noninteractive, as A can compute the ReKey from A to B by himself.
3. In non-transitive schemes, the ReKey from A to C cannot be computed, given the ReKeys from A to B and B to C, whereas in transitive schemes they can be. Our scheme is non-transitive because given dA.e , EncB(d ) and dB.e , EncC (d ), it is not possible to compute dA.e , EncC (d ), for any e .
4. In single-use schemes a re-encrypted ciphertext cannot be re-encrypted again, whereas in a multi-use scheme it can be. As it stands RSA-TBOS-PRE is single-use, because once a signcryption is re-encrypted, it becomes independent of any secret keys; hence if the ReKey is used to re-encrypt again, the second component does not provide the information to decrypt it. However, we later provide an extension to our scheme that converts it to a multi-use scheme.
Additionally, we would like to mention that our scheme maintains the confidentiality of messages even if the secret key of the sender is leaked. This is an interesting property that is carried over in our system from the original RSA-TBOS scheme. We note in accordance with [5] that not all signcryptions have this property, e.g. [14] [6].
ALGORITHMS INVOLVED
We will discuss various models of security for signcryption schemes as well as signcryption schemes with proxy reencryption in this paper. Hence, we first define the various algorithms that will be used in these models.
• Given a security parameter k, the Setup algorithm returns public parameters for the sender and the receiver, along with their secret keys.
• Given the public parameters, the secret key of the delegator and a delegatee, the Extract algorithm returns the unsigncryption key corresponding to the delegatee.
• Given the public parameters, secret key of the sender, a plaintext m and random input r (if required by the algorithm), the Signcrypt algorithm returns the ciphertext C, which is the signcryption of m (with the random value r, if present).
• Given the public parameters, a delegatee and the decryption key corresponding of the delegator, the RKGen algorithm returns a re-encryption key from the delegator to the delegatee.
• Given a re-encryption key ReKeyB→D and a ciphertext CB which is signcrypted for B, the Reencrypt algorithm returns the ciphertext CD which is signcrypted for D.
• Given the unsigncryption key and a ciphertext C, the Unsigncrypt algorithm returns the plaintext or ⊥. Note that this is the same algorithm for the delegator as well as the delegatee, but with different keys.
• Given the signature (underlying the signcryption) the Verify algorithm returns if the signature is valid or ⊥ if it is not.
NON-REPUDIATION AND UNFORGEABILITY
The RSA-TBOS-PRE scheme is a signcryption and therefore it must provide the features that are provided by a digital signature. Two essential qualities of a digital signature are unforgeability and non-repudiation. In an ordinary digital signature scheme, the two notions are equivalent, because if a signature is unforgeable, only the signer can produce it and hence cannot deny that he did so and if a signature is non-repudiable, then it must be unforgeable as otherwise the signer could claim that the signature under consideration was forged. However, a signcryption being an encryption as well, non-repudiation is not straightforward, as only the receiver might be able to verify the authenticity of the signature and proving the veracity of the signature to a third party may be a non-trivial task. In our scheme, however, as in the original RSA-TBOS, non-repudiation is easily achieved by the receiver decrypting the ciphertext up to step 2 and handing it over to the third party for verification.
Several security models have been proposed that deal with non-repudiation and unforgeability of signcryption schemes. We focus on the models proposed in [5] . The original paper on RSA-TBOS [7] also contains a proof for unforgeability. Let us examine the relationship between these models. Informally, the ciphertext authentication model from [5] says that if the adversary is not the sender or the receiver, it is highly unlikely for him to produce a signcryption having an valid underlying signature of (m, σ), without having expressly queried for some signcryption of m from the same sender to the same receiver. The signature non-repudiation model in [5] states that if the adversary is not the sender, then it is highly unlikely for him to produce a signcryption that has a valid underlying signature of (m, σ) without having expressly queried for a signcryption from the same sender containing a valid underlying signature of (m, σ). The original RSA-TBOS paper [7] shows that if the adversary is not the sender, then it is highly unlikely for him to produce a signcryption with a valid underlying signature (m, σ) without having queried for the signcryption of m. Now, it is quite clear that neither of the two models from [5] is stronger than the other. Further, it is also easily seen that the signature non-repudiation model from [5] is stronger than the unforgeability model in [7] as we are allowed to signcryption of any user in the signature non-repudiation model rather than just the receiver as in the model in [7] . RSA-TBOS can be shown to be secure in the signature non-repudiation model just as in shown in [7] , with the only difference being that the signcryption simulator Ssim will now take as argument (N, e) pair of any user rather than just the receiver. We refer the reader to [5] and [7] for a formal description of the models.
NON-REPUDIABILITY OF RSA-TBOS-PRE
Having seen how the signature non-repudiability of the basic RSA-TBOS scheme can be proven, we now show the nonrepudiability of RSA-TBOS-PRE. In order to prove nonrepudiation for the RSA-TBOS-PRE scheme, we require that the sender (say S) use different RSA moduli for signature and encryption. With this minor cost, we will be able to guarantee the non-repudiability of our scheme.
For the signature non-repudiability of a signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption, we propose the following attack game. Let us assume that S is under attack.
Signature Non-Repudiation Attack Game (for schemes with proxy re-encryption)
• Setup: The challenger chooses a security parameter k and runs Setup(k) to obtain the public parameters and various secret keys. The public parameters are revealed to the adversary.
• Probe Stage: In this stage we allow the adversary the following queries:
-Signcrypt(m, r, X) for any plaintext m and random input r for any user X, including S as the sender or the receiver.
-Unsigncrypt(X, C) for any user (including S).
-Extract(X) for any user excluding S.
-RKExtract(S, X) for any delegatee X of S. The challenger responds by running RKGen(S, X) and returning the output.
-Reencrypt(S, X, C) for any ciphertext C and any delegatee X of S.
The following restriction may also be imposed:
-The adversary may not query both the RKExtract(S, X) and Extract(X) for any user X.
• Forge Stage: The adversary returns a ciphertext C. Let (m, σ) be the underlying signature (obtained by partial unsigncryption). The adversary wins the game if Verify(m, σ) = , subject to the condition that no signcryption query answered contained (m, σ) as the underlying signature.
The adversary A is said to be a ( , t) adversary if it outputs the signature (m, σ) in time t with advantage Adv(A) = P r[A wins] = .
Definition 1. (Non-Repudiation for schemes with proxy re-encryption) A signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption with security parameter k is said to be non-repudiable if after the attack game described above being played with any polynomially bounded attacker A, the advantage Adv(A) = P r[A wins] = is a negligible function of k.
To see why RSA-TBOS-PRE is non-repudiable, we make the simple observation that the extra RKExtract, Reencrypt and Unsigncrypt do not provide any information to the adversary as the values returned pertain to a different RSA modulus than the one used for signing as per the discussion at the beginning of this section. Hence, the proof non-repudiability of the RSA-TBOS holds for RSA-TBOS-PRE as well, with exactly the same values of probability. Thus, we see that the RSA-TBOS-PRE retains the feature essential of a signcryption, i.e. non-repudiation of the sender.
MODELS OF SECURITY
RSA-TBOS-PRE is one of the first signcryption schemes with proxy re-encryption and thus there is no explicit mention of any security model suitable for such schemes in the literature. Hence, we must first provide such security models suitable for signcryption schemes with proxy re-encryption. The purpose of this section is to explore, discuss and eventually formally define such models.
A natural starting point for formulation of these models is to study the notions of security for signcryption schemes [11] [8][5] [7] and proxy re-encryption schemes [15] [12] as well as the basic ideas behind these notions of security as formulated originally for encryption schemes [9] . In the following sections, we discuss and then formally define increasingly stronger security models.
Indistinguishable Chosen Plaintext Security (IND-CPA)
A signcryption scheme is supposed to have the properties of an encryption scheme. It is therefore fitting that we define a IND-CPA for such schemes, based on the security definitions for ordinary encryption schemes [10] as well as encryption schemes with proxy re-encryption [13] . Such a definition also makes sense for a scheme with proxy reencryption, since it is not desirable that the confidentiality of the scheme is broken after the adversary has seen the encryptions of a few selected messages. In the IND-CPA model for encryption schemes, decryption queries are not allowed, and we disallow them in this model too. Further, since we have proxy re-encryption in this model, there is also the possibility of the adversary asking for the secret key of one or more of the delegatees, modelling the scenario that one of the delegatees is dishonest. This, however, is prohibited in this model in accordance with the IND-CPA model for proxy re-encryption schemes proposed in [13] . This restriction is sensible, because in an IND-CPA attack, the adversary is allowed to choose only plaintexts, and is not supposed to have decryption capabilities. Providing access to the secret key would violate this, and is therefore disallowed. However, we allow in this model ReKey queries to any number of delegatees in the system, because this models the proxy (who has access to ReKeys) trying to break the system. The proxy is only semi-trusted, and assumed to be curious and hence we must safeguard against the proxy learning any secret information. Note that re-encryption queries are not required since the adversary can re-encrypt himself once he has queried for the ReKey.
Formally, the following is IND-CPA the attack game. Here B is considered to be the user under attack.
IND-CPA Attack Game
• Find Stage:
-Signcrypt(m, r) for any plaintext m and random input r. -RKExtract(B,X) for any delegatee X of B.
The challenger responds by running RKGen(B,X) and returning the output.
• Challenge Stage: The adversary outputs a pair (m0, m1). The challenger then generates a random bit b and returns C * = Signcrypt(m b ,r). Note that in this case the adversary has no control over r. See [7] for a detailed explanation of this.
• 
Indistinguishable Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Security, Weak Version (Weak-IND-CCA2)
Security against IND-CPA attack game described above is necessary, but not sufficient in a practical scenario. In IND-CPA, we expressly disallow decryption queries and queries for the secret key of the delegatees. However, in a practical scenario, the attacker may indeed be one the delegatees (trying to learn the delegators secret key, decrypt messages not delegated to him etc.) which would allow him access to secret key. Multiple delegatees may also collude to attack the delegator or another delegatee. Further, these attackers may be able to temporarily get access to a decryption system of the attacked entity, similar to the scenario in IND-CCA2 attack game of traditional cryptosystems. To model these scenarios, we must allow re-encryption as well as secret key queries (with certain restrictions that ensure sensibility of the attack game, like not querying the secret key of the attacked entity etc.). The entire gamut of queries allowed and the restrictions placed on them are formally defined in the attack game that follows. Once again, B is considered to be the entity under attack.
Weak-IND-CCA2 Attack Game
The challenger responds by running RKGen(B,X) and returning the output. -Reencrypt(B, X, C) for any ciphertext C and any delegatee X of B. -Unsigncrypt(X, C) for any user (including B). -Extract(X) for any delegatee X of B.
There are, however, the following restrictions on the queries: Both RKExtract(B,X) and Extract(X) may not be queried for any delegatee X. -R2: Both Reencrypt(B, X, C) and Extract(X) may not be queried for any delegatee X any ciphertext C.
• Challenge Stage: The adversary outputs a pair (m0, m1).
The challenger then generates a random bit b and returns the C * =Signcrypt(m b ,r). Note that in this case the adversary has no control over r.
• Guess Stage: Same queries as in the Find stage, with restrictions R1 and R2. There are additional restrictions as follows:
-R3: Unsigncrypt(B, C * ) cannot be queried.
-R4: Reencrypt(B, X, C * ) and Unsigncrypt(X, C * ) cannot both be queried.
-R5: Unsigncrypt(X, C * ) cannot be queried if RKExtract(B,X) has been queried at any stage.
-R6: Reencrypt(B, X, C * ) cannot be queried if Extract(X) has been queried at any stage.
• Output Stage: The adversary outputs a bit b , and wins the game if b = b .
The adversary A is said to be a ( , t) adversary if it outputs the bit b in time t with advantage Adv 
Indistinguishable Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Security, Strong Version (IND-CCA2)
It is possible to come up with a model of security that is slightly stronger than the Weak-IND-CCA2 proposed above. Such a model has all the security requirements one would expect of a signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption. This model is exactly the same as the Weak-IND-CCA2 model, except that one of the restrictions is weakened. The restriction:
• R2: Both Reencrypt(B, X, C) and Extract(X) may not be queried for any delegatee X any ciphertext C.
is weakened to
• R * 2 : Both Reencrypt(B, X, C * ) and Extract(X) may not be queried for any delegatee X. (C * is the challenge ciphertext).
In other words, we allow for the adversary to query reencryption of any ciphertext apart from the challenge ciphertext to any delegatee, even a corrupted one for which the adversary knows the secret key. We would like to point out that there is currently no signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption that is IND-CCA2 secure. In fact, the scheme we propose is one of the first to be even Weak-IND-CCA2 secure. However, we stress that it is not impossible to achieve this higher level of security, although it is certainly nontrivial. The chief reason is that once re-encryption queries are allowed to corrupted users, junk re-encryptions can be easily detected by the adversary, and hence the simulator in the IND-CCA2 proof of security must find a way to generate legitimate re-encryptions, even if the adversary queries junk ciphertext. Preventing this querying of junk ciphertext is tantamount to public verifiability of the ciphertext, and there is currently no obvious way of achieving this for known signcryption schemes. Note that use of one-time signatures is not an option, as that would defeat the very purpose of signcryption.
WEAK-CCA2 SECURITY PROOF OF RSA-TBOS-PRE
Having discussed and defined various security notions in the previous section, we now formally prove the security of the RSA-TBOS-PRE scheme in the Weak-IND-CCA2 security model. The proof of security of the scheme is proved in two parts, as follows:
1. In part one, we show that the original RSA-TBOS is IND-CCA2 secure even against a stronger adversary Astr who can make all queries allowed in standard IND-CCA2 plus two extra kinds of queries.
2. In part two, we show that if there exists an polynomially bound adversary A that can break the RSA-TBOS-PRE with non-negligible advantage, then A may be used to construct a polynomially bound strong adversary Astr that can break the original RSA-TBOS system with non-negligible advantage.
The proof has been given in the full version of the paper.
Remark about the Proof
In our proof (available in the full version), we have assumed that the secret key of the sender (say Alice) is not known to the adversary. This is in accordance with [7] . However, as we mentioned previously, even if the secret key of Alice were known to the adversary, it would be of no consequence as far as IND-CCA2 sceurity is concerned. In part one of the proof, we would simply allow the adversary Astr to query Alice's secret key, and since the simulator generates it itself, it could easily answer this query. Notice that Alice's secret key is unrelated to the receiver's (Bob's) RSA parameters and hence it would provide no information and have no bearing on the probabilities calculated. The only advantage available after knowing Alice's secret key is that Astr would be able to generate signcryptions for himself. However, we already provide this facility to Astr. In part two of the proof, if the adversary A queried for Alice's secret key, the constructed adversary Astr would merely ask the RSA-TBOS Oracle for it and return the answer to A . Note that the discussion on A probabilities of generating valid reencrypted ciphertexts would still be valid, as A must still query for the hash function values.
MULTI-USE RSA-TBOS-PRE
The RSA-TBOS-PRE scheme as it stands is a single use scheme, because ciphertext that is re-encrypted once cannot be used for further re-encryptions, as explained previously. However, [13] mention a technique through which many single-use schemes may be converted to multi-use schemes. Although the idea is expressed in the context of identity based schemes, our scheme is pliable enough to apply the technique in [13] .
The central idea behind the conversion to a multi-use scheme is that of proxy re-encryption of the ReKey. Recall that our scheme merely requires an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme for encryption of the second component of the ReKey. Suppose that instead we use an IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme with proxy re-encryption. In that case, the second component of the ReKey can now be reencrypted further. The key to decrypt this second component must now be enclosed in a third component. This process can be continued indefinitely, each time adding one more component. We thus have a multi-use scheme. However, the chief drawback of this scheme is that it leads to ciphertext whose size expands linearly with the number of re-encryptions. However, we would like to stress that this is the state-of-the-art method as far as unidirectional schemes are concerned, and creating a multi-use scheme without linear expansion of ciphertext for unidirectional schemes is an open problem.
We mention here that the properties of signature nonrepudiation and Weak-IND-CCA2 security we have proved for RSA-TBOS-PRE single-use scheme, also hold for this extension. This is simply because the extension is independent of the base system, and thus there is no new useful information available to adversary over that of the base system, and hence there are no new useful queries that the adversary can make. Thus, the adversary is restricted to the attack models in which we have already proven security, causing Multi-Use RSA-TBOS-PRE to have the properties of signature non-repudiation and Weak-IND-CCA2 security.
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
We have extended the concept of proxy re-encryption to signcryption schemes, and have proposed the first signcryption scheme with proxy re-encryption. As proxy re-encryption has proved to be an important tool in the deployment of DRM, we think that this result is of significance to various DRM applications. The simplicity of the scheme and reliance on standard assumptions provide an added advantage. The scheme is based on the RSA-TBOS scheme of Mao et al. [7] . This scheme is more efficient than simply performing a digital signature and adding a layer of proxy re-encryption capable cryptosystem thus retaining the chief advantage of signcryption. Previous work done in this area [15] has concluded that a fundamental problem in this area is to find an IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, multi-use scheme. Such schemes have been proposed in [15] [12] . However, these make use of bilinear maps. It has been suggested in [15] that an IND-CCA2 secure, unidirectional, multi-use scheme not involving bilinear maps is highly desirable. Our scheme is unidirectional, Weak-IND-CCA2 secure, extensible to a multi-use scheme and does not involve bilinear maps. We believe that this represents an important step in the full-fledged solution of the fundamental problem mentioned above.
This work leads to several interesting avenues of research. Arguably the most interesting and important extension would be to create a full-fledged IND-CCA2 secure scheme from our scheme, or to prove the IND-CCA2 security of our scheme if possible. Another interesting direction for research would be to find a signcryption (or even plain encryption) scheme that is secure in the standard model instead of the random oracle model [10] in which we prove security and which does not involve bilinear maps. The last, but by no means the least, important direction of investigation would be to design an extension that converts our single-use scheme to a multi-use scheme that has constant re-encrypted ciphertext size instead of the currently proposed extension that has ciphertext size that linearly expands with the number of reencryptions.
We note here that [16] have independently proposed the idea of splitting the RSA decryption key into two parts. However, this has been done for an encryption scheme and not a signcryption scheme. [16] have proved the scheme CPA-secure, whereas our proof of security is in the Weak-IND-CCA2 model, which is strictly stronger than CPA.
